Seven speeches on sufism. ʻAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ʻAyn al-Quḍāh al-Hamadhānī, -1131.

Ayn al-Qudat is one of the geniuses of Islamic intellectual history and has even been described as the true father of deconstructionism. This text provides a clearly-written critical introduction to the intellectual, literary, religious and philosophical struggles of the 12th century as expressed by one of Islam's greatest and most radical writers.

The Essence of Reality consists of one hundred brief chapters interspersed with Qurʼanic verses, prophetic sayings, Sufi maxims, and poetry. The book takes readers on a philosophical journey, with expositions of questions including the problem of the eternity of the world; the nature of God's essence and attributes; the concepts of "before" and "after"; and the soul's relationship to the body.

An exposition of Islamic mysticism by a Sufi scholar.

ʻAyn al-Quḍāh al-Hamadhānī, ʻAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad, -1131. ; Ontology -- Islam. ; Knowledge, Theory of (Islam). ; Sufis -- Iran -- Biography. ; Muslim philosophers -- Iran -- Biography.

Originally published in 1969. This volume was composed by an eminent Sufi mystic whilst in prison in Baghdad, awaiting execution, in a vain attempt to overthrow his sentence; he was put to death in AD 1311 at the age of 33. This apologia is a document of great poignancy, composed in most elegant Arabic and translated with the customary skill and elegance for which A J Arberry became so well-known.

Biography of ʻAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ʻAyn al-Quḍāh al-Hamadhānī, d. 1131, a Muslim saint from Iran.

Ayn al-Qu t al-Hamadh n (d. 1131) is a defining mystic of medieval Iran whose teachings influenced many Iranian and Indian scholars after him. A major focus in his work is his approach to death as a state of consciousness. Drawing on medieval manuscripts and primary sources, this book offers insight on this mystic and his perception of death.

Beyond Death: The Mystical Teachings of ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī. By Firoozeh Papan-Matin. Islamic History and Civilization, vol. 75. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Pp. x + 242. $150.

The post-classical genre of the “protocols for dialectical inquiry and disputation” has its more proximate origins in the famed Risāla of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. The greater part of his conceptions and methodology, however, consists in a streamlining and universalizing of the more strictly juristic dialectic of his teacher Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī ; and this in turn draws on the highly logicized dialectic of Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī and his teacher Raḍī al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī. At the heart of methods in this lineage, and (...) carried forward by al-Samarqandī into the universal ādāb al-baḥth, are three truth-preserving logical relationships critical to the truth-seeking enterprise of dialectic: entailment, mutual negation or exclusion, and causal concomitance. The practical elaboration of these relations reveals a logic in action—a premodern dialogical logic for living disputation praxis. In fact, so critical were these to the dialectical enterprise that al-Samarqandī devoted a specialized treatise entirely to summarizing their defining features and rules, aptly naming it the ʿAyn al-Naẓar, or “Wellspring of Rational Investigation.” In this article, and drawing upon a recently published digital critical edition, I will present an analytical outline of these core logical relations as presented in the ʿAyn al-Naẓar. Then I will address a number of points of interest in this text, grouped under six themes: the potential for cross-disciplinary advancement; notions in discursive development; significant or uniquely contributive formulations; peculiarities of content; signs of an evolving, universalist agenda; and evidence that the ʿAyn al-Naẓar was designed as an aide-mémoire for the active disputant. (shrink)

This famous Persian mystic was born in Hamadhān in ah 490 or 492 (ad/) and was executed in the same town in 525/ on the charge of heresy. ...

A comprehensive introduction to the life and thought one of the Islamic intellectual tradition's most original and profound authors.

The post-classical (or post-Avicennan, post-Rāzian) genre of the “protocols for dialectical inquiry and disputation” ( _ ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāẓara _ ) has its more proximate origins in the famed _ Risāla _ of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322). The greater part of his conceptions and methodology, however, consists in a streamlining and universalizing of the more strictly juristic dialectic ( _ jadal _ / _ khilāf _ ) of his teacher Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288); and this in turn draws (...) on the highly logicized dialectic of Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218) and his teacher Raḍī al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī (d. 617/1220). At the heart of methods in this lineage, and carried forward by al-Samarqandī into the universal _ ādāb al-baḥth _, are three truth-preserving logical relationships critical to the truth-seeking enterprise of dialectic: entailment ( _ talāzum _ / _ mulāzama _ ), mutual negation or exclusion ( _ tanāfin _ / _ munāfā _ ), and causal concomitance ( _ dawarān _ ). The practical elaboration of these relations reveal... (shrink)

: ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) was a Kubrawī sheikh lived in Simnān one hundred years after Ibn al-Arabī (d. 638/1240). He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism, raised many disciples. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly come to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif (subtle organs), rijāl al-ghaib (men of the unseen), wāqia (dream-like mystical experiences) and tajallī (manifestation). Simnānī’s understanding of the unity influenced subsequent sūfī’s and specifically Ahmad Sirhindī (d. (...) 1034/1624) and his sheikh Bāqībillah’s (d. 1012/1603) views of the unity overlap with Simnānī’s one. In Maktūbāt, Sirhindī who developed the idea of unity of the seen against the unity of the existence expresses that his understanding of being is the same with Simnānī’s one. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of the unity among sūfī’s. Such that, whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. However, his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī was not studied as a whole looking at his ouvre. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq (absolute being) for God. He maintains that it is not convenient to use this concept for al-Haq. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. In this article, causes for Simnānī’s critiques will be discussed and both sūfī’s conceptions of wujūd al-mutlaq and ‘ayn (quintessence) will be studied.Summary: One of the famous names in the Kubrawī tradition, ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī is a sheikh who lived in the city of Simnān in the contemporary Iran between 659-736/1261-1336. In his youth, he served in the service of Arghūn Khan (r. 1284-1291) in the Īlkhānid Palace; and later, after a spiritual experience, he left the palace and turned to a Ṣūfī life. For a certain period, he continued worshipping and riyādhat (spiritual fight against the evil commanding self) on his own, and looked for a guide convenient to his character. Eventually, he became the disciple of the Kubrawī sheikh in Baghdad, Nūr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Isfarāyīnī (d. 717/1317), and obtained ijāzah (permission) for irshād (guidance). After that, with the instruction of his sheikh, he went back to Simnān; and spent rest of his life with guiding his disciples and writing scholarly works. He authored around ninety works in Arabic and Persian on various fields within Sūfism. His contribution to the sūfī tradition mainly comes to forefront regarding problems like unity, latāif, rijāl al-ghaib, wāqia and tajallī; and influenced subsequent sūfī’s. Simnani’s influences can best be seen on the founder of the Mujaddidiyya branch of Naqshbandiyya, Ahmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624), and Sirhindī’s sheikh Bāqībillah (d. 1012/1603). In a letter Bāqībillah wrote to Sirhindī, he mentions certain differences between Simnānī’s understanding of unity and unity of the existence by stating that Simnānī’s path is not that of unity of the existence, and that his shuhūd (seen) is the most perfect shuhūd. Also in the Maktūbāt, Sirhindī expresses that his understanding of being is the same with that of Simnānī’s. Simnānī is also known as the first critic of Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of being and unity among sūfī’s. It would not be incorrect to say that he is more famous for this critique so much so that whenever his name is mentioned the first thing comes to one’s mind has been his criticism against Ibn al-Arabī. The main reason for this is that a letter Simnānī wrote to one of the followers of Ibn al-Arabī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 736/1335) in which Simnānī criticizes Ibn al-Arabī’s conception of unity, was included in the famous work of Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), Nafakhāt al-uns. This letter’s presence in the Nafakhāt played a vital role in its publicity. For this reason, it can be said that Nafakhāt made Simnānī famous. Yet, it should also be said that the fame stemming from Nafakhāt is incomplete and it is just about one aspect of Simnānī, a scholar who authored dozens of books on the Sūfism. Moreover, it is not correct to defend that Simnānī’s statements in that letter reflects a full picture of his opinion about Ibn al-Arabī. Hence, to have a better understanding of his criticism and thoughts about Ibn al-Arabī, one should explore other works of Simnānī as well. Studying Simnānī’s works, it is seen that his criticism is concentrated on two main problems. First is Ibn al-Arabī’s employing the concept wujūd al-mutlaq for God. His second criticism is against a sentence mentioned in al-Futūhāt: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. To understand the first criticism, one needs to know the meaning both sūfī’s attribute to the concept of wujūd al-mutlaq; and for the second the meaning they attribute to the concept of ‘ayn. First, it should be known that Ibn al-Arabī did not think of being as a form category the members of which are beings. To the contrary, he uses wujūd exclusively for the Eternal, and refrains from using the concept of wujūd for the creation; and calls them mawjūd. In other words, Ibn al-Arabī differentiates between being and existence; and limits the concept of being only for the al-Haqq. Ibn al-Arabī states this view repeatedly in statements such as “al-Haqq (the Truth) is being; things, however, are attributes of being.” What Ibn al-Arabī means by wujūd al-mutlaq is al-Haqq who is wajib al-wujūd (the Necessary Being) and free from all restrictions. Thus, in a certain sense wujūd al-mutlaq means wajib al-wujūd. By writing that “Wujūd al-Haqq is the essence of wajib al-wujūd who is qualified with the perfect attributes of eternity and infinity. Absolute Being is the actions emanating from these attributes. Wujūd al-Muqayyad (the Limited Being) is the outcome that comes into existence as a result of these actions”, Simnānī explicitly states that for him Absolute Being is the actions of al-Haqq. What one can understand from the statements of both sūfī’s is that while by wujūd al-mutlaq Ibn al-Arabī refers to wajib al-wujūd (i.e. the essence of al-Haqq), for the same term Simnānī refers to actions of al-Haqq. Since in criticizing Ibn al-Arabī, Simnānī takes into account his own definition of the term Wujūd al-Mutlaq as the actions of al-Haqq, his criticisms are not valid. In fact, both exonerate al-Haqq from all the conditions. However, while Ibn al-Arabī chooses to verbalize the existence of God with the concept of “Absolute Being”, Simnānī only approves to express the existence of God with the concepts of wājib al-wujūd and al-Wujūd al-Haqq and differing from Ibn al-Arabī attributes the meaning of the actions of God to the concept of Absolute Being.Simnānī’s second critique against Ibn al-Arabī is related to this sentence: “سبحان من أظهر الأشياء وهو عينها”. An annotation that is written by Simnānī on a page which is out of his gloss on al-Futūhāt is highly harsh reads as follows: “O, followers of the most deviant leader! If you hear that one says that your sheikh is identical with his beard, put the claim that he is identical with his rejectomenta aside, should you accept this and tolerate him?” It is understood from these sentences that Simnānī considers the concept “al-ayn” as the essence of that thing. Though, the word “al-ayn” is one of the most multi-meaning word in the Arabic language and in Ibn al-Arabī’s works it is used with various meanings such as eye, the quintessence, spring, water source, tangible being of a thing, the essence of a thing and so on. The usage as “the essence of a thing” is very much common in Ibn al-Arabī’s works. It is interesting that while this word has so many meanings, Simnānī takes one meaning as base and blaspheme against Ibn al-Arabī. It is obvious that the main cause for Simnānī’s critique against Ibn al-Arabī in both problems is his attribution to the concepts different meanings than Ibn al-Arabī and then judging him in the context of his attributes. (shrink)

Islamic philosophy - 16th century; Jurjānī, ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad, al- Sayyid al- Sharīf.

Bireyciliğe ve rasyonel egoizme dayalı objektivizm felsefesi ile Ayn Rand, bugün bile tartışmalı bir filozoftur. Ayn Rand her tür kolektivist ahlaka karşı çıkar ve temele toplumun faydası yerine bireyin kişisel faydasını yerleştirir. Ona göre her insan kendi mutluluğundan sorumludur ve bireyin amacı kişisel fayda maksimizasyonunu sağlamak olmalıdır. Rand, “Yemin ederim ki ne bir başkası için yaşayacağım ne de bir başkasının benim için yaşamasını isteyeceğim” sözü ile fedakarlığın zannedildiği gibi erdemli olmadığını, aksine bir ahlaksızlık olduğunu ve iyi yaşama arzusunda olan insanın (...) ondan kaçınması gerektiğini vurgular. Ayn Rand, en başta merkeze Tanrı’yı ya da toplumu koyan ahlak anlayışları olmak üzere tüm etikleri keyfi olarak niteler. Ona göre kurucusu olduğu objektivist etik ise, isminden de anlaşılacağı üzere objektiftir ve aklın bir ürünü olmaktan çok, aklın gerçekliği keşfidir. Bu nedenle Rand’ın ahlak felsefesi insanların keyfiyetine ve kaprislerine değil, objektif gerçekliğe dayalıdır. O, doğa kanunları kadar kesin ve gerçektir. Bu makalede Ayn Rand’ın bu iddiası sorgulanmış, onun ahlak felsefesinin de keyfi öğelere yer verip vermediği incelenmiştir. Bunun adına, önce Ayn Rand’ın objektivizminin ne olduğu kısaca anlatılmıştır. Ardından kendisinin kurucusu olduğu bu ahlak felsefesinin temelinin ne olduğu ve bağlayıcılık problemine makul bir yanıt verip veremediği incelenmiştir. Bunun için, sadece makalelerinden değil, felsefesini kapsamlı bir şekilde anlattığı romanlarından da alıntılar yapılmıştır. (shrink)

A collection of essays argues that philosophy is an essential element of human life--a force that shapes human character and national culture and destiny--and offers the rational philosophy of Objectivism as an alternative.

“Through centuries of scourges and disasters, brought about by your code of morality, you have cried that your code had been broken, that the scourges were punishment for breaking it, that men were too weak and too selfish to spill all the blood it required. You damned man, you damned existence, you damned this earth, but never dared to question your code. . . . You went on crying that your code was noble, but human nature was not good enough (...) to practice it. And no one rose to ask the question: Good?—by what standard? (shrink)

Denies that human senses cannot be trusted, that logic is arbitrary, and that concepts have no basis in reality and discusses universals.

Since man’s mind is his basic tool of survival, his means of gaining knowledge to guide his actions-the basic condition he requires is the freedom to think and to act according to his rational judgment. This does not mean that a man must live alone and that a desert island is the environment best suited to his needs. Men can derive enormous benefits from dealing with one another. A social environment is most conducive to their successful survival—but only on certain (...) conditions. (shrink)

In this beautifully written and brilliantly reasoned book, Ayn Rand throws a new light on the nature of art and its purpose in human life. Once again Miss Rand eloquently demonstrates her refusal to let popular catchwords and conventional ideas stand between her and the truth as she has discovered it. The Romantic Manifesto takes its place beside The Fountainhead as one of the most important achievements of our time.